In today's changed world, the tensions of the Cold War era are rapidly fading away. Even for those of us who lived parts of our lives during the chilliest years of that time, the precipitous collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent momentous events (the most recent of which are almost farcical, like the news that Michail Gorbachev has appeared in a commercial advertisement for Pizza Hut (!)) have cleansed away the memories of suspense, concern, and fear.
So, reviewing the other day some documents concerning the classification of cryptology research (that involved our Society to a substantial degree) and the debate that surrounded the issue at the time of the Diffie-Hellman work (circa 1976-77), I had a strong feeling of detachment from reality.
A first-hand signal of potential trouble to me at the time was a letter that I had received out of the blue (dated August 8, 1977) from Narendra P. Dwivedi, a person I did not know who held the position of Director of Technical Activities of the IEEE. It was a form letter addressed to several recipients who held official positions in our Society, including Fred Jelinek, Aaron Wyner, Marty Hellman, Jim Massey, and others. It read as follows:
Subject: Export Control of Technical Information and Date-Encryption, Cryptology, etc.
Ref: 1. International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) Regulations, 22 CFR 121-128, excepts attached 2. IT Group Newsletter of June 1977
Dear Friends:
A concerned and good-meaning member has drawn our attention to a possible violation by authors of ITAR (International Traffic Arms Regulations) in some subjects which can be linked to be of possible military use. It appears that IEEE and its Groups/Societies/Councils are exempt but the individuals (and/or their employers) have to watch out. I am enclosing the correspondence and excerpts of ITAR.
Based on my experience of working with NASA for a decade, I have the following practical suggestions:
1. If anyone of the authors of a paper is working for a Defense/ NASA Contractor Company, then that author should get the paper cleared as 'unclassified suitable for foreign publication and presentation.'
2. If the sole author of a paper has no clearing facility with the employing institution or is self-employed then the author should refer the paper to the Office of Munitions Control, Dept. of State, Washington, DC for their ruling.
(I have no personal experience of dealing with them).
If you are beginning to feel that it is not always easy to carry out good-intentioned projects, I welcome you to the club and wish you the best.
Yours sincerely,
Narendra P. Dwivedi
The ominous tone of the letter and, most importantly, the terrifying prospect of having to submit papers to the Office of Munitions Control of the State Department, induced more than a chilling effect. Upon inquiry to Mr. Dwivedi on the reasons that I was included in the select list of recipients, I learned of another letter from E.K. Gannett (at the time Staff Secretary of the IEEE Publications Board) to Mr. Dwivedi that prompted the latter to send out his August 8 letter. Here is what Mr. Gannet had to say.
To: N.P. Dwivedi
from: E.K. Gannett
Subject: Regulations on Exporting Technical Data
I am enclosing a letter from J.A. Meyer raising a question of whether certain IEEE activities might be in violation of Government regulations requiring export licenses for publications containing technical data potentially relating to implements of war.
You will see from my reply that IEEE publications are clearly exempt. However, after reviewing the enclosed material you may feel that Professor Ephremides, who is running a preprint distribution program for the Information Theory Group as part of an exchange program with the USSR, should be made aware of the regulations and of Mr. Meyer's letter. Even here, I think the IEEE itself is exempt because the onus, if any, rests with the author or his company. But since we are providing the mechanism, we should perhaps be sure the operators are aware of the rules of the game. But I leave that to your judgment.
So that's what it was! I was sending papers to the Soviet Union that might contain sensitive information! Nightmare Visions of espionage trials, newspaper headlines, deportation, and, yes, even jail began to haunt me. How did I get myself into this? And who was J.A. Meyer? Further investigation on my part revealed his lengthy letter that had started what would develop into a real imbroglio. Mr. Meyer was an IEEE member, but was also an NSA (National Security Agency) employee. It was unclear whether his letter was written in his capacity as the former or as the latter. This ambiguity was in accord with the ambiguity of most NSA public pronouncements, so it generated suspicion that Mr. Meyer's letter was a subliminal message from the Agency. That letter was too long to produce verbatim here. It basically raised the issue that research work performed in the United States (regardless of sponsorship) that had potential ramifications on the Nation's Security, might fall under the purview of Arms Regulations and that, hence, it might require review and approval by the authorities prior to publication.
My first reaction, prompted by the biblical promise that the meek shall inherit the earth, was to call up the Office of Munitions Control and subject them to reading my papers on the multiplicity representation of random processes that I was busy writing at the time. Who knows, perhaps white noise and its properties might be implicated in triggering the "red button," or this might have a relationship to the effects of a nuclear holocaust. Why not? Besides, I did remember that when I was leaving Greece to commence my graduate studies in the United States in 1967, the censorship authorities of the Greek junta at that time who were reviewing the books that I was taking with me, had singled out a text on "Network Theory" and had asked me darkly about what kind of "Networks" did the book study?
Well, my first reaction was moderated by the fear that my papers would never get published if I submitted them for approval by the Office of Munitions Control (and thus I wouldn't make tenure at the University of Maryland) and, more importantly, by the equally universal truth that those who wanted to play "wise-ass" usually got quickly what they deserved! So, I opted for silence and for careful further inquiries into the matter. I know that all this seems almost comical today. I assure you, though, that this was not the case then. We'll examine the sequel of these events in the next issue.